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INTELLIGENCE USERS INTERFACEA. Board of Intelligence Users

A Board of intelligence users consisting of three panels should be established as (Option 1) an Advisory Board to the DCI, or (Option 2) an Advisory Board of the CFI. The three panels would be (1) Political, (2) Economic and (3) Military. This would be implemented as follows:

- Invite all Executive Departments and Agencies to attend on an "as interested" basis; e.g., do not bar DoD from attending political sessions or Treasury from military sessions. Stress that components to be represented should be consumers, not simply the intelligence components of organizations. Use the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) to arrange agendas with the members ahead of time and see that both new issues and product utility items are scheduled. The "open door" policy will initially attract the curious as well as the serious. Both should profit, and the unindoctrinated should learn from those already acquainted with the Intelligence Community. Over a period of time the desirable mix of organizational members would probably occur naturally. Those who are uninterested will drop out, but will do so voluntarily. The free attendance concept should help to develop an interdisciplinary approach to intelligence utilization. This is a concept which is generally absent from present Intelligence Community organizations, but which is becoming more necessary in the management of our international affairs (e.g., energy issues require attention from all sectors--economics, technical, political and even military).
- ④ Congress, or its offices (such as CRS, OTA, GAO, etc.), should be treated separately, but should be included from time to time in Executive session.

It does not appear desirable to assign Departments and Agencies to specific panels. Rather, all members should be invited to attend any panel meetings which interest them. This "floating" system would help lead to the interdisciplinary approach which is one of the primary goals. And, it would help to ensure active participation. The unenthusiastic parties would probably not attend.

The User Panels should be structured so that each covers a very broad area on intelligence problems, as indicated. Panel members should be drawn from the White House Staff, and all elements of the Executive Branch who are or should be involved in national intelligence, particularly those independent bodies which have international responsibilities.

The role of the ICS would be to facilitate the use of this mechanism by the members, work up agendas, present major issues, etc. The ICS would make use of line-intelligence organizations in developing agendas and as "experts" at User Panel meetings.

#### B. Alternatives to a Formal Board of Intelligence Users


It is essential that the interface with the Users be improved. There are various approaches that could cause this "link" to be more firmly established. These can be briefly described as follows:

- Continue past procedures, but put additional emphasis on the need for user-producer interactions. This is a desirable approach, but tends to have "spurts" of success and wither with time. This is primarily because it is totally dependent upon two busy individuals from different organizations working problems that normally result in small specific direct impact (value) on their jobs. It is much easier for them to work out their own problems.

Organizationally, this approach would appear as user-producer interface throughout the wiring diagram. Clearly, accountability is difficult.

- Another approach is for the DCI to have informal discussions with appropriate, small groups of

producers/users. These informal meetings would give the DCI an opportunity to get more direct views than can normally be obtained. Again, this would not allow a direct user input to be included in an evaluation. However, it would indicate the concern of the DCI for more responsive intelligence. Organizationally this would appear as a "staff" action of/for the DCI.



On the Executive of DCI Duty xv

1. Executive Order 11905 includes among the duties of the Director of Central Intelligence:

(xv) Consult with users and producers of intelligence, including the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and the Council of Economic Advisors, to ensure the timeliness, relevancy and quality of the intelligence product.

2. A related provision [Sec. 3.(a)(3)] of EO 11905 states:

The National Security Council shall conduct a semi-annual review of intelligence policies. . . . These reviews shall consider the needs of users of intelligence and the timeliness and quality of intelligence products . . . . The National Security Council shall consult with the Secretary of the Treasury and such other users of intelligence as designated by the President as part of these reviews.

3. These provisions of EO 11905 represent the two factors-- planning and evaluation--which are critical to an effective production function in the Intelligence Community:

a. A mechanism and procedures to determine consumer views on and their future needs for intelligence production.

b. A mechanism and procedures to evaluate the adequacy with which the Community's production meets these needs.

4. There are, of course, any number of ways these functions can be carried out. The proposal put forward in this paper is based on a number of assumptions:

a. That the previous arrangement for determining consumer needs--the NSCIC Working Group--was ineffective. Its membership was drawn from consumer organizations but the members were staff officers with an imperfect understanding of the intelligence process and also not actual consumers of the product. The NSCIC-WG also was not given adequate support by the NSCIC.

b. That a grouping of producers of intelligence would have greater equities in actively seeking out expressions of consumer needs and evaluating the capabilities of the Community to satisfy them. These expressions are a major input to the production manager's determination of his research programs and priorities.

c. That the Product Review function should not be carried out by the producers of intelligence.

d. That the assignment of this responsibility to the NSC, rather than the CFI, was deliberate, reflecting an opinion that the CFI should concentrate on Community resource and management questions.

5. Under this proposal two organizational entities would have the primary responsibilities for implementing the consumer-producer interface and product evaluation functions called for in EO 11905:

a. The first organization dedicated to the development of producer-consumer relations as a prerequisite to effective production planning would be an integral part of the organizational arrangements implemented by the DCI for the production of national intelligence.

(1) it would be composed primarily of intelligence production officers but would also include a representative from the NSC Performance Evaluation Staff (discussed below).

(2) these officers would be senior representatives from CIA, DIA, and INR.

(3) the level of representation should preferably be among those officials directly charged with production responsibilities, e. g., CIA/DDI; DIA/DD PROD; D/INR.\*

b. The second organization would be a small Performance Evaluation Staff attached to the NSC Staff:

(1) this group would perform for the NSC the evaluative functions called for in Sec 3. a. (3) of EO 11905 by assessing how well Community producers respond to consumer needs.

(2) its composition should include some qualified representation from the Intelligence Community and from the principal consumer organizations--State, Defense, JCS, Treasury.

6. The advantages of this proposal are many:

- It requires no expansion of the bureaucratic structure. The Performance Evaluation Staff could be staffed with positions from the IC Product Review Division; the consumer-producer would obtain its staff support from the NIB Secretariat.
- It puts concern with consumer with those officers most involved with this problem and at a level of responsibility where production is not secondary to other concerns.

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\* Depending upon the DCI's arrangements for national intelligence production, this same group, because it would be so involved in the determination of consumer needs, could serve as the means by which action responsibility for NIEs and other inter-Agency production was assigned to Community members.



- It keeps the product evaluation function independent of the producers of intelligence.
- It enables the supporting staff of the CFI to concentrate its energies on critical resource decisions but does not deprive them of the evaluative input prepared by the NSC Performance Evaluation Staff and necessary to the development of their recommendations on production programs and resources.
- It gives visibility to the DCI's concern with consumer relations and to the development of an effective production evaluation function.